CVE-2026-48995

### Summary A malicious `codeload.github.com` server can serve whatever tarball it wants and pnpm will install it regardless of the lockfile. ### Details The lockfile does not store the hash of the dependencies from https://codeload.github.com This means that if this server was compromised or a person's machine configuration was compromised, pnpm would download and install these dependencies. ### PoC ```sh > pnpm -v 10.28.2 ``` Given the following package.json: ```json { "dependencies": { "add": "git://github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep.git#b3eeb9b" } } ``` This produces a lockfile like so: ```yaml lockfileVersion: '9.0' settings: autoInstallPeers: true excludeLinksFromLockfile: false importers: .: dependencies: add: specifier: git://github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep.git#b3eeb9b version: https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b packages: add@https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b: resolution: {tarball: https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b} version: 1.0.0 snapshots: add@https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b: {} ``` Notice that there is no hash. The `b3eeb9b` is not sufficient because I can configure my machine to resolve a compromised tarball from that url (I tested it out and pnpm just installs it). ### Impact Anyone relying on github git dependencies.