CVE-2026-48806

### Description This is a residual bypass of CVE-2026-47732 / GHSA-pr2w-4gpj-cpq4 left after the initial fix for unguarded `__toString()` calls. In 3.26.0 the sandbox visitor was extended to wrap every child node that its parent will string-coerce at runtime with `CheckToStringNode`, gated by the new `CoercesChildrenToStringInterface`. `ArrayExpression` did not implement the interface for its mapping keys: when a dynamic key expression resolves to a `Stringable` object, `ArrayExpression::compile()` emits a raw `(string)` cast (via `StringCastUnary` for `ContextVariable` keys, and no cast at all for richer key expressions). PHP then invokes `__toString()` directly, without ever calling `SandboxExtension::ensureToStringAllowed()`. A sandboxed template author can therefore trigger `__toString()` on any object reachable in the render context by using it as a dynamic mapping key, for example: ```twig {% set arr = {(obj): "value"} %} ``` Direct output of the same object is correctly blocked, which makes this a clear policy enforcement gap. The reliable demonstrated impact is unauthorised disclosure of data returned by `__toString()`. ### Resolution `ArrayExpression` now declares its dynamic mapping keys as string-coercion sites through `CoercesChildrenToStringInterface`, so the sandbox visitor wraps them with `CheckToStringNode` and the policy is consulted before PHP coerces the key to a string. The compiler also keeps an explicit `(string)` cast around the wrapped expression so PHP type errors on non-string keys are preserved. As a side effect, any expression is now accepted as a dynamic mapping key (not only context variables); this is documented as a new feature on the 3.x branch. ### Credits Twig would like to thank El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issue and Fabien Potencier for providing the fix.