CVE-2026-46612

### Summary The Fission `storagesvc` component registers archive CRUD handlers (`/v1/archive` GET / POST / DELETE and `/v1/archives` list) directly on its HTTP router without performing any authentication or authorization. Any caller able to reach the `storagesvc` ClusterIP — including any other workload in the same Kubernetes cluster — could enumerate archive IDs, download archives belonging to other tenants, upload arbitrary archive content, and delete archives. ### Affected component - `pkg/storagesvc/storagesvc.go` — handler registration and per-route handler logic at lines 72-95 (list), 167-199 (download/delete), and 263-270 (route wiring). ### Impact A workload elsewhere in the cluster (e.g. a compromised function pod, a noisy-neighbour tenant in a multi-tenant deployment, or any pod whose egress is not constrained by NetworkPolicy) could: 1. Enumerate every function deployment archive in the cluster. 2. Download the deployment archive of any function in any namespace, exposing the function's source code and any embedded secrets. 3. Delete archives, causing the next function specialization or rebuild to fail. 4. Upload arbitrary archives that subsequent function specializations would fetch and execute. In multi-tenant Fission deployments this completely breaks the tenant boundary for function code. ### Root cause `pkg/storagesvc/storagesvc.go` mounts the handlers without an authentication middleware. Network-layer controls (`NetworkPolicy`) were the only line of defence before this fix, and the chart shipped no `NetworkPolicy` for `storagesvc` by default, so reachability was open. ### Fix Released in [v1.23.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0): - **PR #3368** (commit `2455fc0c`) wraps the `storagesvc` archive routes with the application-layer HMAC verifier from `pkg/auth/hmac` using the `ServiceStoragesvc` derived key. Callers (executor, fetcher, builder, CLI) sign their requests using a shared cluster