CVE-2026-45717

## Summary Budibase exposes a REST API for datasource management. The route `PUT /api/datasources/:datasourceId` is registered in the `authorizedRoutes` group with `TABLE/READ` permission. This is the same authorization level as the read endpoint (`GET /api/datasources/:datasourceId`). Every authenticated Budibase app user with the `BASIC` built-in role or higher carries `TABLE/WRITE` (and therefore `TABLE/READ`) permissions, and the datasource update controller performs no additional builder check. As a result, any authenticated non-builder app user can submit a `PUT` request to rewrite a datasource's `config` object — including the connection `host`, `port`, database credentials, or the base `url` of a REST datasource. Because no network-level SSRF protection is applied to SQL driver connections, redirecting a PostgreSQL/MySQL/MongoDB datasource to an internal IP address succeeds and the attacker can probe or interact with internal services on arbitrary ports. ## Code evidence ### Route registration — wrong authorization group ``` packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts, line 35-37 ``` ```typescript authorizedRoutes .get("/api/datasources/:datasourceId", datasourceController.find) .put("/api/datasources/:datasourceId", datasourceController.update) // <-- should be builderRoutes ``` All destructive (create/delete/verify) operations are gated behind `builderRoutes`: ```typescript builderRoutes .get("/api/datasources", datasourceController.fetch) .post("/api/datasources/verify", datasourceController.verify) .post("/api/datasources", datasourceValidator(), datasourceController.save) .delete("/api/datasources/:datasourceId/:revId", datasourceController.destroy) ``` The `update` route shares the same authorization group as the read route, not the builder group. ### Authorization middleware allows BASIC-role users ``` packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts, lines 46-50 packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts, lines 82-90 pack