CVE-2026-45136

## Summary `tools/quota-statusline.sh` (introduced in v3.5.0) interpolates Claude Code's hook stdin payload directly into a Python triple-quoted string literal. A `'''` byte sequence in any user-controlled field of the payload closes the literal early and lets following bytes execute as Python in the user's Claude Code process. ## Affected versions - v3.5.0 - v3.5.1 ## Patched versions - v3.5.2 ## Affected configurations Users who wired `tools/quota-statusline.sh` into Claude Code's `statusLine` configuration. The v3.5.0 README explicitly recommends this setup, so most users on v3.5.0/v3.5.1 with the recommended setup are affected. ## Attack chain Claude Code's statusline hook payload reflects user-controlled paths (`cwd`, `workspace.current_dir`, `workspace.project_dir`, `transcript_path`). Apostrophes are legal in POSIX filesystem paths. 1. A hostile directory name containing `'''+payload+'''` lands on disk via any normal vector — `git clone`, archive extraction, npm package, downloaded zip, etc. 2. The victim has the recommended `tools/quota-statusline.sh` wired into their CC `statusLine` config. 3. The victim `cd`s anywhere a hostile path is reachable. 4. CC fires the statusline hook on every redraw. The Python literal closes early. The injected bytes execute as Python in the user's process. ## Severity Local code execution at user privilege. Persistent re-fire on every statusline redraw. No user interaction beyond `cd`-ing into the hostile path. The user's shell, CC session, files, SSH keys, and any locally-accessible credentials are reachable from the executed code. ## Vulnerable pattern ```sh input=$(cat) result=$(python3 -c " stdin_data = json.loads('''$input''') if '''$input''' else {} ") ``` ## Fix Capture stdin in bash, export to env, and pipe the Python source through a single-quoted heredoc (`<<'PYEOF'`). Single-quoting disables ALL bash interpolation inside the body. Python reads the JSON via `os.environ.get('CC_INPUT')`, where the