CVE-2026-45090

## Summary `ParameterAnalysis` in `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same `results` channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (`close(results)` at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (`dp`) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, `processParams` executes `results <- paramResult` on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever `options.Data != ""` (i.e., the attacker supplies the `data` field) and the target reflects at least one parameter. ## Severity **High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` - **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer. - **Attack Complexity:** Low — the attacker controls both trigger conditions: the `data` field that populates the second stage's work queue, and the target URL they point at a reflective server they control. - **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `""`, so no auth middleware is registered. - **User Interaction:** None. - **Scope:** Unchanged — a goroutine panic without a `recover` terminates the entire Go process; the impact stays within the dalfox process authority. - **Confidentiality Impact:** None. - **Integrity Impact:** None. - **Availability Impact:** High — the entire dalfox server process crashes, requiring manual restart. A single well-timed request is sufficient. **Note on PR #917**: Commit `8a424d1` (`fix: resolve data race and nil pointer panic in processParams`) fixed two concurrent-safety bugs in `processParams` — a data race on `paramResult.Chars` and a nil pointer dereference o