CVE-2026-45089

## Summary When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` fields in `model.Options` are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with `os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY` and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the `IsLibrary` guard in `DalLog`, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem. ## Severity **High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.2) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L` - **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default. - **Attack Complexity:** Low — no preconditions; all trigger options (`output`, `output-all`, `debug`) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body. - **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `""`, so the auth middleware is never registered. - **User Interaction:** None. - **Scope:** Unchanged — the file write stays within the dalfox process's OS authority. - **Confidentiality Impact:** None — this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller. - **Integrity Impact:** High — the attacker has full control over which file path is opened, enabling creation of new files or corruption of existing files anywhere the dalfox process has write permission. While the log content format is semi-fixed, the file path is entirely attacker-determined, making the integrity violation complete with respect to file targeting. - **Availability Impact:** Low — corrupting application configuration files or log files on the host can degrade the availability of other services relying on those files. ## Affected Component - `cmd/server.go` — `init()