CVE-2026-45087

# GHSA: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via `found-action` in Dalfox Server Mode ## Summary When dalfox is started in REST API server mode (`dalfox server`), the server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default and requires no API key unless the operator explicitly passes `--api-key`. Because `model.Options` — including `FoundAction` and `FoundActionShell` — is deserialized directly from attacker-supplied JSON in `POST /scan`, and because `dalfox.Initialize` explicitly propagates those two fields into the final scan options without stripping them, any unauthenticated caller who can reach the server port can supply an arbitrary shell command that the dalfox process will execute on the host whenever a scan finding is triggered. ## Severity **Critical** (CVSS 3.1: 10.0) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` - **Attack Vector:** Network — the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default; reachable by any network peer. - **Attack Complexity:** Low — the attacker fully controls the scanned URL and can trivially host a one-line reflective server to guarantee a finding is triggered. - **Privileges Required:** None — no API key is enforced in the default configuration. - **User Interaction:** None. - **Scope:** Changed — exploitation escapes the dalfox process boundary and executes arbitrary commands on the host OS. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High — full read access to the host filesystem and secrets in the process environment. - **Integrity Impact:** High — arbitrary file writes, code deployment, persistence mechanisms. - **Availability Impact:** High — process kill, resource exhaustion, service disruption. ## Affected Component - `cmd/server.go` — `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `""` - `pkg/server/server.go` — `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != ""` - `pkg/server/server.go` — `postScanHandler()` (lines 173–191): `rq.Options` passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization - `lib/func.go` — `Initialize()` (line