CVE-2026-126363

## Summary The `@astrojs/solid-js` renderer wraps named slot content passed to Solid components in an `<astro-slot>` element, and writes the slot name into its `name` attribute without HTML escaping. A slot name containing `"` could end the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML into the page. For example, a page that takes a slot name from the request: ```astro --- import Tabs from '../components/Tabs.jsx'; const tab = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab'); --- <Tabs client:load active={tab}><div slot={tab}>…</div></Tabs> ``` rendered with a Solid component that renders a slot by name: ```jsx export default function Tabs(props) { return <div>{props[props.active]}</div>; } ``` would output a `tab` value such as `x"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>` as live HTML. ## Impact Reflected cross-site scripting. An attacker who gets a user to open a crafted link can run JavaScript on the site's origin, but only in applications where all of the following are true: - The page passes request-controlled input (such as a query parameter) as a slot name. - The Solid component is hydrated with a `client:*` directive. For non-hydrated components the slot wrapper is removed from the output, together with its `name` attribute. - The Solid component renders the attacker-chosen slot, which in practice means accessing slot props by a dynamic name. Components that never render the slot only output Astro's already escaped fallback template. This is the `@astrojs/solid-js` counterpart of GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp (CVE-2026-50146), which fixed the same issue in `astro` core. ## Affected versions `@astrojs/solid-js` >= 0.2.0, <= 7.1.1. ## Patches Fixed in `@astrojs/solid-js` 7.1.2. Slot names are now HTML-escaped in the server renderer. ## Workarounds Upgrade to `@astrojs/solid-js` 7.1.2 or later. Before upgrading, do not use request-controlled input as a slot name, or map it to a fixed set of known slot names before passing it to a component. ## Credits Reported by @manus-pi.