CVE-2026-115877

## Summary An incomplete header-value validation (CWE-444) in the Twisted HTTP server lets a bare carriage return or line feed in a header value hide a following header from the parser. `twisted.web.http.HTTPChannel.headerReceived` rejects a NUL byte in a header value but not a bare CR or LF, even though RFC 9110 section 5.5 requires a recipient to reject all three. Because the channel splits requests only on CRLF, a value carrying a bare LF and a second header arrives as one line, so the second header is folded into the value and the request is framed with no body. A front-end that treats the bare LF as a line terminator frames the request differently, and the disagreement lets an attacker smuggle a request past it. This is an incomplete fix of the earlier Twisted request-smuggling advisories, which guarded the NUL sibling of this exact check. ## Details `headerReceived` splits a header line on the first colon, strips space and tab from the value, and validates it with a single test that rejects only NUL: ```python # twisted/web/http.py HTTPChannel.headerReceived data = data.strip(b" \t") if b"\x00" in data: # NUL rejected; a bare CR or LF is not self._respondToBadRequestAndDisconnect() return False ``` The channel delimiter is CRLF, so `Foo: x\nContent-Length: 39` is one line: the split yields name `Foo` and value `x\nContent-Length: 39`, `strip` leaves the LF, and the NUL check passes. `_maybeChooseTransferDecoder` is then called with `Foo`, never sees a `Content-Length`, and installs no body decoder, so the request is framed with an empty body. The header name and request line already reject CR and LF, so the value is the only gap. Affected product: Twisted, `twisted.web.http.HTTPChannel` Affected versions: 26.4.0 and earlier ## PoC Feed one connection a request whose header value carries a bare LF and a `Content-Length`, followed by a second request in the bytes after it: `POST /public HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: v\r\nFoo: x\nContent-Length: 44\