HIGHCVSS v3.1 7.4Vulnerability

CVE-2026-115463

### Summary The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout The email second factor is a six-digit code drawn from `mt_rand()` and verified with no attempt limit, so an attacker who already has the password can brute-force it inside its validity window. `lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php`, in `generateEmailVerificationCode()`: ```php $numericCode = mt_rand(100000, 999999); ``` That is a 900,000-value space, and `mt_rand()` is a Mersenne Twister rather than a CSPRNG, so it is not appropriate for a security token in the first place. PHP provides `random_int()` for exactly this. The bigger problem is that nothing limits guesses. `lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php` calls: ```php $isValid = $this->mfaService->verifyCode($userId, $code); ``` and on failure the only action taken is: ```php $this->logger->warning('[MfaVerifyController] Verification failed for user ID: {user_id}', ['user_id' => $userId]); ``` I grepped that controller for any counter, lockout, throttle or rate limit and found nothing beyond log statements. So an attacker holding valid credentials submits codes until one lands. Against 900,000 values with no ceiling on attempts, the only thing standing in the way is the code's validity window and however fast requests can be issued. That defeats the purpose of the second factor: it is meant to hold even when the password is known, and here it reduces to a race the attacker is likely to win with sustained requests. Two separate fixes, and I would treat the second as the urgent one: 1. Generate the code with `random_int(100000, 999999)` so it is not predictable from RNG state. 2. Enforce a failed-attempt counter tied to the user and the pending MFA session, invalidating the code and requiring a fresh one after a small number of wrong guesses, plus a per-account and per-IP rate limit on the verify endpoint. Scope: source-verified at `master`. I confirmed the generator, the verify cal

Properties

Severity
high
Summary
Poweradmin: The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout, so an attacker holding the password can brute-force it within the validity window
Nvd fetched at
2026-11-22T12:30:49.958423+00:00
Epss score
0.009
Cvss severity
HIGH
Cvss score
7.4
Retrieved at
2026-11-22T12:32:25+00:00
Ghsa published
2026-11-20T14:52:33Z
Source url
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p
Ghsa updated
2026-11-20T14:52:33Z
Ghsa id
GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p
Last source
FIRST EPSS
Score
7.4
Cvss version
3.1
Cve id
CVE-2026-115463
Cvss vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
First seen by Signal
2026-11-19T23:31:53+00:00
Name
CVE-2026-115463
Is ghsa only
false
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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CVE-2026-115463 (CVSS v3.1 7.4) — Ninja Signal Threat Intelligence | Ninja Signal