CVE-2026-115463
### Summary The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout The email second factor is a six-digit code drawn from `mt_rand()` and verified with no attempt limit, so an attacker who already has the password can brute-force it inside its validity window. `lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php`, in `generateEmailVerificationCode()`: ```php $numericCode = mt_rand(100000, 999999); ``` That is a 900,000-value space, and `mt_rand()` is a Mersenne Twister rather than a CSPRNG, so it is not appropriate for a security token in the first place. PHP provides `random_int()` for exactly this. The bigger problem is that nothing limits guesses. `lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php` calls: ```php $isValid = $this->mfaService->verifyCode($userId, $code); ``` and on failure the only action taken is: ```php $this->logger->warning('[MfaVerifyController] Verification failed for user ID: {user_id}', ['user_id' => $userId]); ``` I grepped that controller for any counter, lockout, throttle or rate limit and found nothing beyond log statements. So an attacker holding valid credentials submits codes until one lands. Against 900,000 values with no ceiling on attempts, the only thing standing in the way is the code's validity window and however fast requests can be issued. That defeats the purpose of the second factor: it is meant to hold even when the password is known, and here it reduces to a race the attacker is likely to win with sustained requests. Two separate fixes, and I would treat the second as the urgent one: 1. Generate the code with `random_int(100000, 999999)` so it is not predictable from RNG state. 2. Enforce a failed-attempt counter tied to the user and the pending MFA session, invalidating the code and requiring a fresh one after a small number of wrong guesses, plus a per-account and per-IP rate limit on the verify endpoint. Scope: source-verified at `master`. I confirmed the generator, the verify cal
Properties
- Severity
- high
- Summary
- Poweradmin: The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout, so an attacker holding the password can brute-force it within the validity window
- Nvd fetched at
- 2026-11-22T12:30:49.958423+00:00
- Epss score
- 0.009
- Cvss severity
- HIGH
- Cvss score
- 7.4
- Retrieved at
- 2026-11-22T12:32:25+00:00
- Ghsa published
- 2026-11-20T14:52:33Z
- Source url
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p
- Ghsa updated
- 2026-11-20T14:52:33Z
- Ghsa id
- GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p
- Last source
- FIRST EPSS
- Score
- 7.4
- Cvss version
- 3.1
- Cve id
- CVE-2026-115463
- Cvss vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- First seen by Signal
- 2026-11-19T23:31:53+00:00
- Name
- CVE-2026-115463
- Is ghsa only
- false
- Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Related Entities (4)
HAS_WEAKNESS (2)
AFFECTS (1)
VULNERABLE_TO (1)
Related research
Explore deeper with Ninja Signal's threat intelligence graph